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[L. A. Xo. ~!1307. In B ank. May 15, 1962.] 
Estate of JOSEPH GILMAKER, Deceased. JOSEPH 
LOUIS GII-lMAKER, Petitioner and Appellant, v. BANK 
OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS 
ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, etc., Defendant and Re-
spondent. 
[L. A. No. 26186. In Bank. May 15, 1962.] 
Estate of JOSEPH GILMAKER, Deceased. JOSEPH 
LOUIS GILMAKER, Contestant and Appellant, v. 
BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST AND SAV-
INGS ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, etc., Petitioner and 
Respondent. 
[1] Trusts-Removal of Trustee-Jurisdiction: Appeal.-Where in 
probate proceedings a life beneficiary's notice of motion to 
remove 11. trustee and the supporting affidavit fully set forth 
the facts relied on for relief, the trustee appeared and de-
fended on the merits, and the other beneficiaries were not in-
dispensable parties, the notice of motion and supporting affi-
davit coupled with the trustee's appearance were sufficient to 
invoke the trial court's general equity jurisdiction, and its 
order denying' the motion was appealable as 11. final judgment. 
[2] ld.-Management of Trust Property-Deposit of Trust Funds. 
-Under a trust instrument requiring the trustee to keep no 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trusts, ~ 217; Am.Jur., Trusts, § 370. 
McK. Dig. References: [I, 4-6] Trusts, § 200; [2] Trusts, § 216; 
[3] Tru~ts, § 354. 
d 
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lllorc funds in one bank than was insured by the Federal 
Dcposit Insnrance Corporation, thc t rustcc was undcr a duty 
to place thc funds in ynrious instituti ons where they would be 
fully insured by such corporll tion, though instructions given 
by the life beneficiary, as a consultnnt, to deposit the money 
in designated savings and loan associations were insufficient. 
[3] ld.-Accounting by Trustee.-Under a trust instrument requir-
ing the trustee to provide thc life beneficiary, who was also 
appointed by the trust instrulllcnt as consultant, with a 
semiannual accounting of receipts and disbursements for each 
parcel of real estate in the trust, which the trustee agreed 
to do, the trustee could not thereafter contend that such ser-
vice was unusual or special. 
[4] ld.-Removal of Trustee-Grounds.-Hostility between bene-
ficiary and trustee is a ground for removal of the trustee when 
the hostility impairs the proper administration of the trust. 
[5] ld.-Removal of Trustee-Hostility.-Where the proper ad-
ministration of a trust required that there be no hostility be-
tween the trustee and the beneficiary-consultant, and whel'tl 
the latter owned an undivided half interest in property the 
other half of which was in the trust, and he had experienctl 
managing the entire property before the death of the trustor, 
his task as consultant was to advise, not simply passively to 
concur or veto, the trustee did not have the sole power to 
propose the investment and reinvestment of trust funds, and 
a close working arrangement was called for between trustee 
and consultant. 
[6] ld.-Removal of Trustee-Discretion of Court.-Although the 
removal and substitution of a trustee is largely within the 
discretion of the trial court, where it was undisputed that 
the trustee failed to disperse surplus cash and failed to pro-
vide a segregated semiannual accounting, as was required by 
the trust instrument, and where the trustee's only defense, 
which was insufficient, was that it was not legally obligated 
to do either, the hostility between trustee and beneficiary im· 
paired the proper administration of the trust and required 
the removal and substitution of the trustee. 
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County denying removal and substitution of a trustee 
of a testamentary trust and instructing such trustee. George 
Francis· and Beach Vasey, Judges. Reversed. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trusts, § 166 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trusts, §§ 128, 
130 . 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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Eric A. Rose and Pray, Price & Williams for Appellant. 
Johnson & Johnson and George R. Johnson for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In his will Joseph Gilmaker created a 
testamentary trust. Under the terms of the trust instrument, 
which was incorporated in the final decree of distribution, 
the Bank of America is to serve as trustee and petitioner 
Joseph Louis Gilmaker is to be the sole life beneficiary. 
On his death the remainder is to go to petitioner's wife and 
children. Petitioner is also appointed by the trust instrument 
as" Consultant, and the Trustee shall not sell, lease, exchange, 
hypothecate, or improve any property which is a part of the 
trust estate, or invest or reinvest any trust estate funds until 
it has first notified said Consultant in writing of its intention 
to so act and received from said Consultant his written 
approval of the action so proposed." 
A large part of the trust property is undivided one-half 
interests in parcels of real property, the other one-half of 
which is owned by petitioner. The trust instrument provides 
that "The trustee shall not maintain in anyone bank or 
branch thereof a cash balance of more than the maximum 
balance insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, but shall distribute trust funds among as many banks 
as necessary to secure full protection against loss through 
bank failure." The trustee, however, "shall accept and 
comply with any instructions of defendant's said son, JOSEPH 
LOUIS GILMAKER, relating to the selection of banks in which 
such deposits are to be made." The trustee is also to provide 
the consultant "semi-annually with an itemized statement 
setting out income and expense for each parcel of improved 
real estate in the trust estate, and [he] shall be consulted 
regarding the amount of fire and other insurance carried on 
each parceL" 
Petitioner moved for the removal and substitution of the 
trustee. He alleged in his motion, and stated in his affidavit, 
that the trustee had maintained $49,000 in one bank account; 
that the trustee has refused to provide him with the semi-
annual accounting, called for by the trust instrument; and 
that the trustee has refused to consult with him as provided 
in the trust instrument. The motion for removal was denied. 
In a separate proceeding the trustee sought instructions con-
cerning its power. The trial court found that the "trustee 
has the sole power to propose the investment and re-investment 
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of trust funds" subject to the approyal of the consultant. 
Petitioner appeals from the order denying removal and the 
order instructing the trustee. 
In Estate of Schloss, 56 Ca1.2<l 248, 253-256 [14 Cal.Rptr. 
643, 363 P.2d 875], we hcld that the superior court sitting 
ill probate has no jurisdidion to remove a trustee of a testa-
mentary trust after distribution (see Prob. Code, §§ 1120-
1130) and that the court's power to remove such a trustee 
must be exercised pursuant to its general equity jurisdiction. 
(See Civ. Code, § 2283.) In support of this conclusion we 
pointed out that the Legislature made no provision for an 
appeal from an order in probate removing a trustee. (See 
Prob. Code, § 1240.) The trustee contends, therefore, that 
the trial court did not err in denying petitioner's motion in 
the probate proceedings to remove it as trustee and that the 
appeal from that order must be dismissed. In the Schloss 
case, however, the trustees raised the question of jurisdiction 
by demurring to the petition for their removal in the trial 
court, and that question was the principal issue on appeal 
In the present case, the trustee did not object in the trial 
court to its assumption of jurisdiction and did not raise the 
question on appeal until after the appeal was decided by the 
District Court of Appeal and a hearing was granted in this 
court. [1] Petitioner's notice of motion to remove the 
trustee and its supporting affidavit fully set forth the facts 
relied upon for relief, the trustee appeared and defended 
on the merits, and the other beneficiaries were not indis-
pensable parties. (Bowles Y. Superior Court, 44 Ca1.2d 574, 
584 [283 P.2d 704].) Under these circumstances the notice 
of motion and supporting affidavit coupled with the trustee's 
appearance were sufficient to invoke the trial court's general 
equity jurisdiction (In re Estate of Thompson, 101 Cal. 349, 
353-354 [35 P. 991, 36 P. 98, 508] ; In re Estate of De Leon, 
102 Cal. 537, 541 [36 P. 864] ; In re Estate of Clary, 112 Cal. 
292,294-295 [44 P . 569] ; Faxon Y. A.ll Persons, 166 Cal. 707, 
712 [137 P. 919, L.R.A. 1916B 1209]; see also Sehlyen Y. 
Schlyen, 43 Ca1.2d 361, 378 [273 P .2d 897] ; Coons v. Henry, 
186 Cal.App.2d 512, 519 [9 Cal.Rptr. 258] ; Estate of 1\Iullins. 
190 Cal.App.2d 413, 417-418 [12 Cal.R.ptr. 3]; Phillips y. 
Beilsten, 164 Cal.App.2d 450, 457-458 [330 P.2d 912]; cf. 
Estate of Davis, 136 Cal. 590, 597 [69 P. 412] ; King Y. Chase, 
159 Cal. 420, 424-425 [115 P. 207]), and its order denying 
petitioner's motion is appealable as a final judgment in the 
action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 963, subd. 1.) 
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Petitioner contenus that the trustee violated its duty by 
maintaluing $49,000 in one bank account and by refusing to 
provide a particularized semiannual accounting. He furtli('r 
contends that hostility and disagreement between him and 
the trustee prevcnts the consultation the testator considered 
essential to the proper administration of the trust. The trustee 
contends that it is willing to follow petitioner's suggestions 
concerning the deposit of the $49,000, but that the petitioner 
has thus far suggested only savings and loan associations and 
not banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion; and that it is willing to make the kind of semiannual 
accounting called for by the trust instrument but that such 
an accounting would be an extraordinary service for which 
it would charge an extraordinary fee. The trustee further 
contends that all its suggestions for investment have been 
prudent; that the consultant's only function is to veto and 
not to advise; and that whatever hostility exists between the 
trustee and the consultant has not impaired the proper admin-
istration of the trust. 
[2] By maintaining $49,000 in cash in one trust account 
the trustee failed to follow the trust directions. Under the 
trust instrument the trustee could keep no more funds in one 
bank than was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
insures a maximum of $10,000 of any trust estate deposited 
in a bank. (12 U.S.C.A., § 1817(i).) It is true that the 
instructions given by the consultant to deposit the money 
in designated savings anu loan associations were insufficient. 
Savings and loan association accounts can be insured by the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, not by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. (Sec 12 U.S.C.A., 
§§ 1724 et seq.; 12 U.S.C.A., §§ 1811 et seq.) Eyen in the 
absence of sufficient directions from the consultant, however, 
the trustee was under the duty to place the funds in various 
institutions where they would be fully insured by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. [3] Furthermore, the trus-
tee was under a duty to provide the consultant with a semi-
annual accounting of receipts and disbursements for each 
parcel of real estate in the trust. It may be, as the trustee 
contends, that usually such an accounting is extraordinary 
and that its practice is to report the receipts and disburse-
ments for the entire trust without segregating the parcels. 
In the trust instrument, however, the trustee expressly agreed 
to provide a segregated accounting. The annual compensation 
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of the trustee is to be three-quarters of one per cent of the 
r easonable value of the trust estate, and "For any un usual 
or special services, a reasonable additional cOJ:1peusatioll." 
The trustee cannot now contend that a service it expressly 
agreed to provide is unusual or special. 
[4] Hostility between the henefi ciary and the trustee 
is a ground for removal of the trustee when the hostility im-
pairs the proper administration of the trust. ( B rown Y. 
Memorial Nat . Home Founda.tion, 162 Cal.App.2d 513, 53-1 
[329 P.2d 118, 75 A.L .R.2d 427] ; Ovcrcll v. Overell, 78 Cal. 
App. 251, 258-260 [248 P. 310]; V est v. Bialson, 365 Mo. 
1103, 1121-1122 [293 S.W.2d 369] ; Rest., Trusts, § 107, com. 
c; 1 Scott on Trusts (2d ed.), p. 778; Bogert on Trusts (2d 
ed.), § 527, pp. 376-378.) 
The hostility between the trustee and petitioner has been 
constant and intense. There has been disagreement over the 
investment of the surplus cash ; over who should collect the 
rents from the real property; and over the kind of insurance 
to carryon the property. At one time, according to uncon -
tradicted testimony, one of the trustee's senior trust officers 
told petitioner : "Now, listen here. You've been coming down 
here at least once a week bothering us and you do not have 
to come back any more. I'11 put a stop to this and we'11 peti-
tion the Court for instructions relating to the investments." 
[5] The proper administration of the trust requires that 
there be no hostility between the trustee and the beneficiary-
consultant. '" Consultant' means a person not a trustee 
designated in a trust to advise or direct the trustee in respec t 
of any matters or things connected with the trust, or "hose 
consent or approval is required to purchases, sales, ex-
changes, or other transactions on the part of the trustee." 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1700.6.) Petitioner is not only appointrd 
a consultant under the trust, he is also the sole life beneficiary; 
he owns an undivided one-half interest in property the other 
half of which is in the trust, and he had experience managiJl!! 
the entire property before the death of his father . In these 
circumstances the task of the consultant is to advise, not 
simply passively to concur or veto. The trustee does not 
have, as the instructions of the trial court stated, the "sole 
power to pI:opose the investment and re-investment of trust 
funds." A close working relationship is called for between 
the trustee and the consultant. Furthermore, the organiza-
tion of the staff of the trustee is not conducive to reestablish-
ing a relationship free from existing hostility. Tru"t de-
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ci~ions are made by the trustee's trust committee. The trust 
committee does not meet with outsiders. Thus messages be-
tween the trustee and the consultant must pass through a 
trust officer, who himself has no power to make decisions. 
This conduit mechanism has magnified existing difficulties and 
is not likely to improve them. 
[6] The removal and substitution of a trustee is largely 
within the discretion of the trial court. (Jones v. St1tbbs, 
136 Cal.App.2d 490, 501-502 [288 P.2d 939] ; Estate of Keys-
ton, 102 Cal.App.2d 223, 228 (227 P.2d 17].) It is undis· 
puted, however, that the trustee failed to disperse the surplus 
cash of $49,000 and failed to provide a segregated semiannual 
accounting. The trustee's only defense, which is insufficient, 
was that it is not legally obligated to do either. The hostility 
between the trustee and petitioner has impaired the proper 
administration of the trust, and therefore requires the removal 
and substitution of the trustee. 
The orders denying removal and substitution of the trustee, 
and instructing the trustee, are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Peters, J., and White, J., con-
curred. 
